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Within this specific institutional framework, a new 
agreement was signed in 1951. It led to the con-
struction of the notorious Thule Air Force Base 
(AFB) which hosted nuclear and even thermonu-
clear weapons during the early years of the Cold 
War3. An early-warning Radar Station was also built 
in Thule in 19534. It was updated in 2004 during the 
first three-party dialogue between Nuuk (Home 
Rule Government), Copenhagen and Washington. 
This meeting took place in a very particular con-
text5: at that time, the question of the “National 
Missile Defense” proposed by George W. Bush di-
vided the Old Continent.
Nowadays, Thule AFB hosts “the 21st Space Wing’s 
global network of sensors providing missile warn-
ing, space surveillance and space control to North 
American Aerospace Defense Command and Air 
Force Space Command.”6 The installations are 
also home of the 12th Space Warning Squadron 
which is in charge of detecting and tracking ICBMs 
launched against North America. Finally, “Thule is 
also host to Detachment one of the 23rd Space Op-
erations Squadron, part of the 50th Space Wing’s 
global satellite control network.”7
3 All kind of nuclear activities ceased in Greenland after a B-52 crashed with 
four thermonuclear bombs in January 1968.
4 Dozens of Inuit families were forced off their lands in 1953 to allow expan-
sion of the base. The Inuit community called for the closure of Thule AFB in 
2003, while the US authorities wanted to update their facilities. See: “Inuit 
battle to shut US air base”, BBC News, 3rd November 2003, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/europe/3236083.stm, visited on  26 February 2013.
5 “Thule Upgraded Early Warning Radar”, Missile Threat, 30 November 2012 
http://missilethreat.com/defense-systems/thule-early-warning-radar/, visit-
ed on 26 February 2013.
6 “821st Air Base Group”, Peterson Air Force Base, http://www.peterson.
af.mil/units/821stairbase/index.asp, visited on 26 February 2013.
7 Ibidem
Last summer, 97% of the ice-sheet in Greenland melted in only four days1. Beyond the envi-
ronmental aspect, this event also raised huge 
strategic and economic questions. Located in an 
area whose geopolitical importance considerably 
increased due to global warming, the largest is-
land in the world still belongs to the Kingdom of 
Denmark. Nevertheless, it got self-rule and the 
right to become independent from Copenhagen 
in 2009. This possible independence attracts sev-
eral States interested in the wide range of possi-
bilities the already – very – autonomous territory 
has to offer.
A geostrategic key-point
For the United States of America
Before the environmental and commercial is-
sues renewed the geopolitical importance of the 
2,166,086 km2-island, Washington already consid-
ered Greenland as a strategic key-point in the 19th 
century. This interest grew further during the Sec-
ond World War. In 1941, the US authorities signed 
the US-Danish Defense Agreement. This allowed 
them to build meteorological stations and military 
bases of vital importance for the continuation of 
the war. However, “the agreement was legally un-
conventional”2: Henrik Kauffmann, the Danish am-
bassador at that time, signed, contrary to the or-
ders from Copenhagen which was under German 
occupation. This juridical problem was only solved 
with the inclusion of Denmark in NATO.
1 “Greenland ice sheet melted at unprecedented rate during July”, The 
Guardian, 24 July 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/
jul/24/greenland-ice-sheet-thaw-nasa, visited on 25 February 2012.
2 OLESEN Thorsten Borring, “Tango for Thule. The Dilemmas and Limits of 
the “Neither Confirm nor Deny” Doctrine in Danish-American Relations, 
1957–1968”, Journal of Cold War Studies, vol. XIII, n°2, p. 119.
Should Greenland be fully independent, it seems 
obvious that its 57,000 inhabitants will not be really 
able to assure their security. Therefore, as Damien 
Degeorges writes: “the closer US-Greenland ties 
can be seen as an investment from the United 
States on a possible future Greenlandic indepen-
dence.”8 As the United States intends to remain 
the major power in the area, it does not hesitate 
to use its soft power in a crucial domain for the 
future State: education. Initiatives like “Students 
on Ice” or “University of Arctic” are specifically 
aimed at enhancing the academic cooperation be-
tween Nuuk and Washington. Fulbright grants are 
also available for Greenlandic students9.
For the Kingdom of Denmark
If the United States becomes the protector of a fu-
ture Greenlandic State, it should not be forgotten 
that Denmark still runs the defense and foreign 
policies of its former colony. Ties between Nuuk 
and Copenhagen date back to the beginning of the 
18th century and are still strong. “Ten percent of 
the population lives in Denmark; they study, work 
or are being treated at hospitals there for free.”10 
The royal family could also be an important bond 
in case of a future independence.
Beyond these “low politics” elements, other di-
mensions need to be taken into account. Nuuk of-
fers to Copenhagen a real “window on the Arctic” 
of crucial importance given the current geopoliti-
cal situation. Through Greenland, Denmark enjoys 
a strategic position on the Northwest Passage, a 
potential commercial route that could be open 
three to six months a year in the near future. How-
ever, its navigation will remain complicated due 
to the presence of icebergs. It also offers fewer 
advantages than the Northeast Route in terms of 
distance11.
As for Greenland, the extension of the Danish EEZ 
is a more important issue. As a reminder, the Arc-
tic “accounts for about 13 percent of the undis-
covered oil (and) 30 percent of the undiscovered 
8 DEGEORGES Damien, The Role of Greenland in the Arctic, Paris: Institut de 
recherche stratégique de l’Ecole militaire, Laboratoire de l’IRSEM, n°7, avril 
2012, p.45.
9 http://denmark.usembassy.gov/gl.jc.study.html
10 “No, Greenland Does Not Belong to China”, New York Times, 20 February 
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/21/opinion/no-greenland-does-not-
belong-to-china.html, visited on 4 March 2013.
11 LASSERRE Frédéric, “Géopolitiques arctiques : pétrole et routes mari-
times au cœur des rivalités regionals”, Critique internationale, n°49, avril 
2010, p.141.
natural gas”12. About 84% of these reserves are 
supposed to be offshore. Therefore, each Arctic 
State seeks to expand its influence on the region 
through the legal means provided by the United 
Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS). As a re-
sult, Copenhagen has to deal with two border dis-
putes: 
- After four decades, the Lincoln Sea dispute be-
tween Canada and Denmark seems to be nearly 
resolved: in December 2012, both countries decid-
ed to strike a line equidistant from each coastline. 
Nevertheless, the agreement “does not address 
the sovereignty of Hans Island, a 1.3 square kilo-
meter (…) rock that sits between Ellesmere and 
Greenland.”13 On the one hand, Ottawa fears that 
by giving up its claims on this tiny island, it would 
send a negative signal to Washington in the case 
of the Beaufort Sea dispute. On the other hand, 
the Danish do not want to lose face in front of the 
Greenlandic people.
- The Lomonossov Ridge dispute, which does not 
only involve Ottawa and Copenhagen but Mos-
cow this time.
As Lasserre noted, the risk of regional escalation 
seems very limited. Cooperation between the dif-
ferent Arctic States is real. Nevertheless, the sta-
bility provided by the Danish Army – especially by 
its Navy – is another element that continues to link 
Nuuk with Copenhagen. The reinforcement of its 
presence in Thule and in Nord Station, the Sirius 
patrols14 and the commissioning of three new Ivar 
Huitfeldt class-frigates15 can be seen as various 
ways for the Danish to reaffirm their stakes in the 
area. The creation of a Danish “Commonwealth” 
in which Copenhagen would insure Greenland’s 
security could be a solution in case of indepen-
dence16.
For the European Union
12 “90 Billion Barrels of Oil and 1,670 Trillion Cubic Feet of Natural Gas As-
sessed in the Arctic”, U.S. Geological Survey, 23 July 2008, http://www.usgs.
gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=1980 - .US81MzCQUZk, visited on 5 March 
2013.
13 “Canada, Denmark closer to settling border dispute”, The Global Mail, 
29 November 2012, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/can-
ada-denmark-closer-to-settling-border-dispute/article5831571/?page=all, 
visited on 5th March 2013.
14 “Each autumn, six dog sledge teams - each manned by two soldiers 
from the Royal Danish Navy - spend up to six months patrolling an area 
of 160,000 sq km.” These dog sledge patrols are used by Copenhagen to 
reaffirm its presence in the region. For more information, see: “Greenland 
by dog sledge: The Sirius Patrol in numbers”, BBC News, 30 November 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-15940985, visited on 5 March 2013.
15 “La classe Huitfeldt à la mer”, Défense et Sécurité Internationale, http://
www.dsi-presse.com/?p=5034, visited on 5 March 2013.
16 DEGEORGES Damien, op. cit., p.42.
The European Union (EU) is closely linked to 
Greenland’s recent history. The island was granted 
home rule in 1979, after Denmark joined the Euro-
pean Economic Community (EEC) against Green-
landers’ will in 1973. The Greenlandic authorities 
finally decided to leave the EEC in 1985 because of 
the fishing issue. However, even if the island is not 
part of the EU, it is listed as one of the 25 “Over-
seas Countries and Territories”. Therefore, Nuuk 
enjoys various benefits from the EU in “economic 
and trade co-operation, sustainable development 
and regional co-operation and integration.”17
Beside these regular measures, Greenland also 
concluded various agreements in different areas. 
“Under the terms of the new [EU-Greenland Fish-
eries Partnership Agreement], the EU will annually 
provide a financial contribution, including sectoral 
support, to Greenland, to a maximum amount of 
€17.8 million.”18 On the whole, the financial sup-
port from Brussels to Nuuk between 2007 and 
2013 should amount to € 25 million (in 2006 pric-
es). With such figures, the EU still remains Green-
land’s main backer. Environmental issues are also 
at the heart of several agreements involving the 
European Environment Agency (EEA).
A key area for the future of the relationship be-
tween the EU and Greenland may be education. In 
this domain, the “soft power” elements are cur-
rently playing in favor of Brussels (Erasmus and 
Comenius programs for example). The European 
unique currency also seems to have a good attrac-
tive power. The younger generations are indeed 
more pragmatic towards the Union, which could 
be interesting in the long term19.
Should Greenland be independent, the EU would 
lose the only territory that grants it a direct ac-
cess to the Arctic region. Even if six of its Mem-
ber States have the status of permanent observ-
ers at the Arctic Council, the main decisions are 
not taken within this institutional framework. 
Some Arctic States, especially Canada and Russia, 
would like the debate to take place between the 
only five bordering States (United States, Canada, 
17 “EU relations with its associated Overseas Territories and Countries”, 
European Union External Action, http://eeas.europa.eu/oct/index_en.htm, 
visited on 6 March 2013.
18 Developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region: progress 
since 2008 and next steps, Brussels: European Commission, 2012, p. 18. Avai-
lable on: http://eeas.europa.eu/arctic_region/docs/join_2012_19.pdf
19 DEGEORGES Damien, L’Arctique : une région d’avenir pour l’Union euro-
péenne et l’économie mondiale, Brussels : Fondation Robert Schuman, Ques-
tion d’Europe, n°263, January 2013, p. 4.
Denmark, Norway and Russia)20. This is a real chal-
lenge for the EU whose interests in the Arctic are 
not only geostrategic...
The raw materials issue
Beside the environmental and geostrategic issues, 
various raw materials are also at the heart of great 
powers’ interests in Greenland. Rare earth ele-
ments, uranium, gas and oil can be extraordinary 
assets for the future of the Greenlandic people. 
However, they could also undermine its possible 
independence.
Rare Earth Elements and uranium
The importance of rare earth elements (REE) grew 
further over the past decade. If these 17 chemical 
elements (15 from the “lanthanides” group plus yt-
trium and scandium) are more abundant than oth-
er minerals, “they are not concentrated enough 
to make them easily exploitable economically.”21 
These REE can be used in a wide number of do-
mains: “green energy” (hybrid motors), informa-
tion technology (hard drives), medicine (medical 
X-ray units) and defense (jet fighter engines).
According to the European Commission, Green-
land could stock 9.16% of world’s total rare earth 
reserves22. The Kvanefjeld ore in the South of the 
island could turn out to be one of the biggest de-
posits of REE in the world. According to some spe-
cialists, “[this ore] is not just extremely large, [it] 
also contains a favourable mix of rare earth ele-
ments.”23 With such figures, the arrival of non-Chi-
nese exploitation firms (like the Australian Green-
land Minerals and Energy Ltd that is exploring the 
area) in Kvanefjeld could solve the global supply 
problem. For the moment, China, whose REE re-
serves are estimated at a level between 36 and 
50% of world reserves, is the source of “over 97% 
of the global supply.”24
The rare earth elements are of major importance 
for several powers, especially for the neigh-
20 EIFFLING Vincent, STRUYE DE SWIELANDE Tanguy, L’Arctique : nouvel 
Eldorado ?, Louvain-la-Neuve : Chaire InBev-Baillet Latour, Note d’analyse, 
n°15, March 2011, p. 45.
21 HUMPHRIES Marc, Rare Earth Elements: The Global Supply Chain, Wash-
ington: Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress, June 
2012, p. 2.
22 Greenland’s raw materials potential and the EU strategic needs, Brussels: 
European Commission, 13 June 2013, p.1.
23 “Rare Earth Elements at Kvanefjeld”, Greenland Minerals and Energy LTD, 
http://www.ggg.gl/rare-earth-elements/rare-earth-elements-at-kvanefjeld/, 
visited on 12 March 2013.
24 MORRISON Wayne M., China’s Rare Earth Industry and Export Regime: 
Economic and Trade Implications for the United States, Washington: Con-
gressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress, April 2012, p. 1
boring EU. In 2010, the European Commission 
ranked these elements as “critical to the health 
of Europe’s manufacturing base”25. Accordingly, 
EU Commissioner Antonio Tajani met Prime Min-
ister Kuupik Kleist in June 2010 to try to conclude 
a win-win agreement between both parties (pref-
erential access to raw materials in exchange for 
technology and environmental expertise). How-
ever, in January 2013, Kleist announced he refused 
to promote EU’s interests at the expense of other 
powers’, i.e. China.
Beijing seems to be a major concern for several 
scholars who consider that the country intends to 
be the only producer on the rare earth market26. 
After having kept low prices for years, the authori-
ties decided to restrict the export quotas in 2009 in 
order to spare these valuable minerals. This mea-
sure led the United States to reopen the Mountain 
Pass facility in 2012. The latter was closed ten years 
earlier, when the Chinese dramatically increased 
their production27. Besides, these rare earth ele-
ments can also be used as a “trade weapon”. In 
2010, as part of the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, Chi-
na blocked its REE exports to Tokyo. This incited 
the Japanese authorities to look for alternatives 
(discovery of new deposits28 and conclusion of an 
agreement with India last November29).
According to some specialists, Greenland could 
supply at least 25% of global REE demand in the 
future. However, the rare earth elements in 
Kvanefjeld are closely connected to radioactive 
materials - especially uranium -, which raises two 
distinct problems:
- The lack of skilled workers. This issue was finally 
solved by a bill passed by the island’s parliament in 
December 2012. It is now possible for non-Green-
landic firms to bring their own workers in the is-
land in order to develop large mining projects. 
This measure has been criticized “for allowing 
companies to employ cheap foreign workers, at 
25 The EU’s Developing Raw materials diplomacy, Washington, DC: Bertels-
mann Foundation, 2011, p. 1.
26 De RAVIGNAN Antoine, “Jeu de dupes sur le marché des terres rares”, 
Alternatives économiques, Hors-série n°11, juillet 2012, p. 77.
27 “A Visit to the Only American Mine for Rare Earth Metals”, The Atlantic, 
12 February 2012, http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/02/
a-visit-to-the-only-american-mine-for-rare-earth-metals/253372/, visited on 
12 March 2013
28 “Japan finds major rare earth deposits”, News.com.au, 2 August 2012, 
http://www.news.com.au/business/breaking-news/japan-finds-major-ra-
re-earth-deposits/story-e6frfkur-1226412676374, visited on 12 March 2013.
29 “Japan Signs Deal With India on Rare Earth Production”, Supply, 
Bloomberg, 16 November 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-
16/japan-signs-deal-with-india-on-rare-earth-production-supply.html, visited 
on 12 March 2013.
the expense of local employment.”30 The fear is so 
real that this massive arrival of non-Greenlandic 
workers could threaten the traditional way of live.
- The real problem is related to the exploitation of 
uranium itself. If Nuuk can freely exploit its raw 
materials, this radioactive mineral raises various 
questions in Copenhagen. Denmark has indeed al-
ways been at the forefront of the environmental 
issues. Among the Greenlandic political elite, divi-
sions are also deep between the supporters of the 
“zero-tolerance policy” on the one hand and the 
partisans of the exploitation on the other hand. 
The March 2013 parliamentary elections were 
mainly held about this sensitive topic. These polls 
were won by the centrist Siumut Party whose 
leader, Aleqa Hammond, intends to lower the 
pace as far as immigration of foreign workers is 
concerned. Nevertheless, her party is “ready to 
accept uranium mining if the ore contains a max-
imum 0.1 per cent uranium oxide” while Kleist’s 
party adheres to a zero-tolerance policy31.
Other resources
Beyond the rare earth elements and uranium, 
Greenland also contains various valuable resourc-
es. As for hydrocarbons, the island does not have 
any proven gas or oil reserve for the moment. 
Several exclusive exploration and exploitation li-
censes were granted to companies such as Cairn 
Industry (Scotland), ConocoPhillips, Exxon Mobil, 
Chevron (USA), Shell (UK and Netherlands), GDF 
Suez (France), Maersk Oil, Statoil (Norway), NUN-
AOIL (Greenland), DONG Energy (Denmark), Hus-
ky Oil (Canada) and PA Resources (Sweden)32. 
Hitherto, nothing was discovered in the investi-
gated areas, i.e. the Baffin Bay and the Davis Strait. 
Nevertheless, the USGS estimated the Northeast 
Greenland reserves to 31.4 billion barrels of oil 
equivalent of oil, gas, and natural gas liquids. “In 
comparison to the world´s 500 other oil and gas 
provinces, if this resource is proved and realized, 
northeastern Greenland would rank 19th.”33
30 “Danish U-turn clears way for uranium mining in Greenland”, Euractiv, 
29 January 2013, http://www.euractiv.com/specialreport-rawmaterials/turn-
denmark-ready-uranium-adven-news-517403, visited on 18 March 2013.
31 “Mining Proponents Win Greenland Election”, Eye on the Arctic, 13 
March 2013, http://eyeonthearctic.rcinet.ca/mining-proponents-win-green-
land-election/, visited on 18 March 2013.
32 See the map of current exploitations released by the Greenlandic Bureau 
of Minerals and Petroleum: http://bmp.gl/images/stories/minerals/list_of_li-
cences/Licence_map.pdf
33 “USGS Releases New Oil and Gas Assessment of Northeastern Green-
land”, U.S. Geological Survey, 28 August 2007, http://www.usgs.gov/news-
room/article.asp?ID=1750, visited on 19 March 2013.
The island is also supposed to contain up to 10% of the 
global fresh water reserves. Such figures are interesting 
for countries that suffer from water shortages. To this 
extend, China is one of the great powers that could be 
the most interested in such a hydraulic potential in 
the next decades. Beyond this aspect, Greenlandic 
water reserves could also have a major impact on 
the production of hydroelectric energy. According 
to some scholars, Nuuk could ensure 2% of the US 
electric consumption through a network of ca-
bles34.
Iron is another mineral that attracts foreign inves-
tors. “London Mining, a British company, wants 
to open a $2.3 billion iron ore mine that would 
be financed, built, and operated mainly by the 
Chinese.”35 However, even if talks were held be-
tween this firm and a Chinese State-owned Com-
pany based in Sichuan, no concrete result has 
been reached so far. Moreover, the Siumut’s vic-
tory, opposed to the massive immigration of for-
eign workers, could put an end to this project. The 
same situation arose with Alcoa’s project. On the 
one hand, the implantation of the world aluminum 
giant in Maniitsoq (2000 inhabitants) could solve 
the unemployment problem. On the other hand, 
it would also involve the arrival of Chinese work-
ers and would generate, according to some local 
political leaders, crime problems due to prostitu-
tion36.
Conclusion
Due to the melt of the Arctic, Greenland is at the 
center of a new geopolitical key-area. How will the 
island tackle the challenges that are looming up? 
In order to try to answer this question, we will pick 
up some elements of the small powers realist the-
ory.
As examined before, with only 57,000 inhabitants 
spread over a huge territory, Greenland is really 
limited in terms of material means. Its population 
is so small that it cannot exploit its own natural 
riches, which raises crucial questions about the 
near future of this strategic island. This limitation 
is one of the most important criteria used by Asle 
Toje to define a small power37. Another important 
34 DEGEORGES Damien, Terres rares : enjeu géopolitique du XXIe siècle, Pa-
ris : L’Harmattan, 2012, p. 30.
35 “Chinese Workers—in Greenland?”, Bloomberg Business Week, 10 Febru-
ary 2013, http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-02-10/chinese-work-
ers-in-greenland, visited on 19 March 2013.
36 “Small-Town Greenland Prepares for Influx of Foreign Workers”, The 
Epoch Times, 31 October 2012, http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/world/
small-town-greenland-prepares-for-influx-of-foreign-workers-309919.html, 
visited on 19 March 2013.
37 TOJE Asle, “The European Union as a Small Power”, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 2011, vol. IL, n°1, pp. 47-48.
theoretical point in order to grasp the Greenlandic 
situation is the fact that small powers cannot rely 
on their sole capabilities to ensure their own secu-
rity: they have to appeal to more powerful States. 
Accordingly, these countries can remain neutral, 
play the card of the “balance of power” or resort 
to alliances. However, “the balance of power” 
strategy requires “a relative equilibrium among 
the Great Powers”38, which is not always the con-
figuration of the international system. Therefore, 
small powers tend to use the “alliances strategy” 
to guarantee their security.
These theoretical considerations give us interest-
ing clues to analyze the future of the island. First 
and foremost, the independence should not be 
taken for granted: ties between Nuuk and Copen-
hagen are still strong and if this should happen, 
they would not disappear. As for security matters, 
Denmark could always have a major role to play in 
the framework of a structure like, for example, a 
“Danish Commonwealth”. The role of Washington 
should not be neglected neither. Even if it is ex-
aggerated to claim that Greenland will be the 51st 
State of the United States of America, it is clear 
that ties between the two capitals will strength-
en because of the presence of both Thule AFB 
and raw materials, especially rare earth elements, 
whose China still controls 97% of world produc-
tion.
More than ever, Greenland is the mirror of the 
challenges the international system is confronted 
with. At the forefront of the climatic changes, the 
Greenlandic authorities are still closely linked with 
Western powers, especially Denmark and the Unit-
ed States. Nevertheless, Nuuk has to deal with the 
growing influence of China that seeks to secure its 
provisions in raw materials. Finally, the big loser of 
the current situation may be the European Union 
itself. In case of independence, the EU would in-
deed lose its only direct access to a key geopoliti-
cal area, whose resources might help it to diversify 
its sources of supply in various raw materials.
38 ROTHSTEIN Robert L., Alliances and Small Powers, New-York: Columbia 
University Press, 1968,  p. 12.
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